A ‘SIMPLE’ MODEL
FOR CLEARANCE
by Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]

Image 1. A bridge over the Tigris River, 6 km north of Fallujah. ISIS destroyed the bridge to prevent civilians fleeing
the city when the Iraqi Security Forces offensive began.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

W

hen in control of the area of Iraq north of Baghdad,

infrastructure.2 In addition, so-called humanitarian tasks

including the city of Fallujah, ISIS prepared to

focus on clearance of IED belts composed of victim-operated

defend its position from inevitable government

IEDs (VOIEDs).

counterattack through the widespread use of improvised ex-

Recovery. Following clearance by the United Nations

plosive devices (IEDs) laid as defensive obstacles in patterns

Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq, from 1 October 2016

similar to conventional minefields.1 The subsequent destruc-

through 22 January 2019, the United Nations Development

tion of bridges over the Tigris River further strengthened

Programme (UNDP) completed 199 stabilization tasks in

the ability of ISIS to defend the city and prevent the civilians

Fallujah and surrounding areas. These tasks were managed by

trapped within from escaping.

the UNDP and assigned in cooperation with the Government

Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) liberated Fallujah

of Iraq through the Funding Facility for Stability (FFS)—ef-

in May 2016, explosive hazards (EH), most significantly IEDs

fectively a clearing house to assign and prioritize clearance

that lie as “weapons in wait,” continue the conflict today by

tasks so as to restore key infrastructure. In addition, in co-

depriving the Fallujah economy and society of a full recovery.

operation with other organizations, UNMAS completed 119

For example, only after the removal of two submerged IEDs in

humanitarian tasks.

August 2018, was the notorious Iron Bridge reopened to traf-

Mandate. Gradual progress may not be progress enough,

fic after which a two-hour detour once again became a five-

however, when considered from a public and political per-

minute trip for many accessing a nearby maternity hospital.

spective leading to the urgency of a “sooner-than-later”

Tasks. The bridge restoration is typical of so-called stabi-

mandate for those organizations including UNMAS Iraq re-

lization tasks in Fallujah that focus on EH clearance need-

sponsible for EH clearance. Arguably, this is the critical first

ed prior to restoration of essential public services and light

step toward follow-on timely repair of infrastructure and
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Figure 1. Known and suspected IED contamination around Fallujah (as of January 2019).
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

ultimately the safe return home for the 1.8 million Iraqis still

safely commence clearance activities. Moreover, the IEDD

internally displaced, many living in camps. Such a mandate

community can then learn how to optimize clearance assets.

immediately leads to practical problems insofar as IED dis-

This then leads to two questions concerning EH clearance

posal (IEDD) operators need to understand the threats faced

in Fallujah:

from two aspects: type and environment.
Implications. IEDD operators must identify and classify threats, consolidate and interpret related data, and thereby assess the threat environment. The more effectively the

1. What can the data tell us about the extent and type of
IEDs encountered?3
2. What might the data contribute to the threat environment model?

IEDD operators can draw practical conclusions about both

Findings. UNMAS Iraq clearance data compiled during ac-

the threats and the threat environments, the sooner they can

tivities in Fallujah leads to three conclusions key to assessing

Images 2 and 3. Typical plastic (left) and “speed bump” (right) main charge containers in Fallujah.
Images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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extending 10 km, and sometimes adding multiple rows for
density. A location in the al-Shuhada area of Fallujah (see
Image 4) illustrates a two-row deep pattern with five plastic
jerry can type main charges visible (shown with red circles to
the right) representing the first row and a single main charge
(to the left) representing part of a second row. The presence
of buildings in the background (indicated by the black arrow) illustrates the proximity of EH contamination to residential areas.
Switches. Nearly all VOIEDs recovered in Fallujah are triggered by pressure plates made from two flexible steel strips,
Image 4. A typical IED obstacle belt on the outskirts of
Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

averaging 60 cm in length, 3 cm in width, and 4 mm thickness. The two strips are normally separated by a spacer such as
a piece of wood, leaving a distance of around 1.5 cm between

and managing on-going clearance tasks and deployment of

the steel strips to be closed for the switch to function. Most

clearance assets in Fallujah:4,5

recovered pressure plates have been wrapped in black rubber

1. Technical. Most IEDs found in Fallujah have been victim-

such as an inner tube from a vehicle tire or plastic for weather-

operated (high-metal content pressure plate) devices,

proofing. There is usually little attempt to camouflage the

only occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices.

switches other than to bury them, normally to a depth of 5 cm

2. Threat. The EH environment can be defined as relatively

beneath the surface. Sometimes several pressure plates will be

simple when compared to other areas of Iraq (see accom-

discovered in close proximity wrapped in the same color plas-

panying article, page 13).

tic and type suggesting a bulk manufacturing process.

3. Coverage. The amount and extent of contamination remains the biggest clearance problem.

Some VOIEDs feature an additional VO switch often
called a crush wire contact or “rosary beads.” The beads

Basis. EH clearance tasks completed by UNMAS Iraq since
October 2016 provide a basis for the conclusions drawn regarding threat type, environment, and coverage. UNMAS
Iraq operators cleared a total of 568 complete IEDs along with
1,139 other explosive remnants of war (ERW) from a coverage
area of 2,586,546 sq m and safely removed another 4,384 IED
main charges and components from this same area. In addition, UNMAS Iraq rendered safe and handed over to ISF nearly 10,000 kg of IED explosive content for destruction.
Components. Almost without exception, the IEDs recovered in Fallujah are victim-operated (VO) and crudely manufactured, but effective. The most common type uses a plastic
container such as a commercial jerry can filled with 10–20 kg
of ammonium nitrate and aluminum-based homemade explosive (HME), high-metal contract pressure plate(s), a 9-volt
battery, detonating cord of varying length, and a commerciallymanufactured electrical detonator. A common variant uses a
crudely–fabricated, low-grade, steel-flattened box (colloquially known as an “explosive speed bump”) for the main charge
filled with the same weight and types of explosive. In the explosive speed bump variant, the explosive is often wrapped in a
plastic bag to protect against weathering.
In most known cases, these devices are laid in large numbers in linear patterns of 5-to-10 m spacing, in some cases

Image 5. A pressure plate wrapped in orange plastic discovered in Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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refer to tiny open switch-

Type 3, a rarely used variant, configures the pressure plate

es spaced at 10–30 cm in-

vertically. This type has been used to target mechanical assets

tervals along lacquered

and their operators, in particular bulldozers that have been

wire insulated by clear

used to breach IED belts. These pressure plates are similar to

plastic tubing. The entire

but much smaller than (no more than 30 cm in length) Types

switch can exceed 10 m in
length. While more prevalent in complex and urban environments, they
account for roughly five
percent of switches used

Image 6. A typical crush wire
contact. Several dozen switches like this may be present on
lengths of lacquered wire up to
10 m in length.7

Image
com.

courtesy

of

www.iedawareness.

1 and 2. Type 3 variants are also buried much deeper (normally 10–15 cm). Setting them in a vertical plane and placed in
locations where ISIS anticipated bulldozers might be used to
move earth (for example, in tracks) allows for the targeting of
valuable mechanical assets, initiating the IED when they are
pushed aside with earth. While the main charges recovered

on VOIEDS recovered from Fallujah’s contaminated areas

in Fallujah are not large enough to destroy armored vehicles,

to date, according to knowledgeable operators’ anecdotal re-

they can cause extensive damage.

ports. To the untrained person, these can be difficult to locate
visually or with a metal detector (see Image 5).

Although currently there is no accurate data on the precise
numbers of anti-lift switches recovered, anecdotal evidence

Batteries are occasionally found as the spacer inside pres-

from interviews with international IEDD operators suggests

sure plates but more often are simply wrapped in tape for

that less than 10 percent of IEDs recovered to date are fitted

weatherproofing and lie close to the main charge, again sub-

with these devices.

surface. Voltage checks on a small number of recovered batter-

Consistency. There is certainly sufficient evidence from an

ies have revealed charges of a full 9-volts present, suggesting

analysis of the 568 IEDs recovered to date from Fallujah by

that most IEDs present are likely viable devices.

UNMAS Iraq operators to draw a number of conclusions, all

Main charges are usually buried separated from the battery

relating to consistencies.

by a distance of up to 2 m, again at a depth of around 5 cm.

First, the design of pressure plates and main charges (either

Some devices have been recovered with double pressure plates

plastic or the explosive speed bump variant) is normally the

to a single main charge, others with double main charges from

same. This suggests that a deliberate and well-planned pro-

the same pressure plate. Whatever the variant, devices tend to

duction facility existed and was capable of manufacturing a

be found in groups of identical devices and similarly spaced to

large number of pressure plates and main charges with a rela-

those as already described. Operators in Fallujah have found

tively high standard of design and reliability.

and neutralized a number of VOIEDs equipped with antihandling devices of three types.

Second, the configuration of the device in the ground is normally similar enough to be predictable. In a given line of IEDs,

Type 1 is fabricated from a plastic electrical box approxi-

it is extremely unusual to find a device where the switch, main

mately 10 cm squared and 5 cm deep with a rocker-type switch

charge, and power source are

protruding from one face and laid subsurface typically 20 cm

not located in the same lay-

from the main charge. When set, the switch is held down by a

out. This suggests that these

brick or rock that, in most cases, is obviously and clearly out of

IEDs are probably laid by

place. The switch can be closed by removing the brick or rock,

relatively unskilled persons

as well as stepping on the pressure plate, probably targeting a

taught to emplace the IEDs

tendency of novice operators to clear the area around a sus-

through a series of steps or

pected IED before beginning render safe procedures (RSPs).

rules as a drill.

Type 2 uses the same pressure release mechanism but situates the switch underneath the main charge container. This
method, recovered from several neutralized IEDs in Fallujah,
targets an IED operator or virtually anyone else discovering and lifting the main charge from the ground. While the
switch is easily discovered by a trained IED operator, for the
less experienced or untrained person it can exploit actions
that might lead them to believe a device is safe when it is not—
for example, by severing the physical link to the switch.
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Images 7 and 8. An in-place anti-lift switch. Note the
presence of the rock on the anti-handling switch and the
proximity of that switch to the main charge.
Images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

Third, the IED belts in Fallujah reveal a remarkable consis-

roles in setting IEDs, or have knowledge of their exis-

tency in their pattern not unlike Warsaw Pact tactics for estab-

tence have proven to be a significant source of informa-

lishing defensive minefields. Given the quantities and types of

tion concerning details on locations and emplacement

Soviet equipment used by Saddam’s Iraqi Army, it is reasonable

methods, contributing to Non-technical Surveys as

to assume some individuals trained in conventional methods

well as subsequent clearance operations.

for laying minefields later offered their services to ISIS.
Implications. What might the community conclude from the

7. Render Safe. In terms of neutralization and RSPs,
analysis of recovered IEDs strengthens an argument

data related to the work done in Fallujah concerning the types

that this is a simple environment for three reasons.

and locations of IEDs rendered safe? To answer this question,

»» Easy to locate. Standard metal detection equipment

operators need to evaluate their findings relative to the envi-

can identify extremely strong metal signatures from

ronment and RSPs. On that basis, the findings related to work

the ubiquitous high-metal content pressure plate

in Fallujah show consistent and predictable patterns useful

»» Signature. Detector heads can localize and define

in planning, conducting clearance operations, and managing

the size of the signature, often defining the pressure

clearance assets efficiently.

plate before any manual intervention takes place

Model. These consistent and predictable qualities argue for

»» Visual. Even the crush wire contact switch has

and help to define what the community might term a simple

proved relatively easy to detect by trained personnel,

model. Several factors support this argument:

firstly by using the naked eye and secondly by detect-

1. Location. IEDs were deployed in belts by ISIS on the pe-

ing a strong signature via the Minelab F3 Compact

riphery of Fallujah for a clear purpose, namely to stall any

used by the majority of UNMAS High Risk Search

ISF assault. In these mostly rural areas, the ground could
be dug easily and quickly for emplacement purposes.

Teams in Fallujah.7
Given the relatively “clean” environment these IEDs exist

2. Clutter. Although the defensive belts often cut through

within, as well as the identification and cancellation of spu-

open ground adjacent to residential and other built-

rious contacts (including UXO scrap such as shrapnel), RSPs

up areas, they otherwise tend to be relatively clean,

are normally a relatively simple and quick process.

with little surface or subsurface metallic contamination present other than occasional items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and associated scrap metal such as
mortar-tail sections.

Conclusion
In summary, consistency and relative simplicity of device design and layout as described greatly facilitate RSPs in

3. Dimension. Except on rare occasions—classified as the

Fallujah. Where an IED operator is working within an estab-

Type 3 IED that uses a vertical pressure plate switch and

lished IED belt, the consistency of the device’s linear pattern,

thereby could be viewed as a three-dimensional threat—

regular spacing, and makeup is usually obvious. This then

almost all IEDs in Fallujah are two-dimensional threats

gives search teams, team leaders, and IED operators a degree

located either at the surface or subsurface with clear im-

of confidence in planning and conducting clearance activities.

plications for RSPs.

Exceptions. Where secondary switches are incorporated into

4. Degradation. IEDs are susceptible to degradation for

devices, their presence so far has been obvious. For switches

reason of seasonal variations in weather, in particu-

utilizing a brick or rock to encourage pressure release, a pair

lar the cumulative effect of repeated heavy rainfall and

of wires can easily be located running from the suspected

flooding. The impact of weathering is especially notice-

switch location toward the main charge. For pressure re-

able on ammonium nitrate-based explosives. Numerous

lease switches, the careful fingertip exploration of the area

main charges recovered have shown both plastic and

around the suspected main charge normally identifies wires

metal casings shattered by explosives expanding as they

running from the detonator (always found on the top of

absorb water. Type 2 IEDs’ (explosive speed bumps)

the main charges) to the underside of the main charge con-

main charges are also susceptible to rapid oxidation of

tainer. Regardless of the presence of anti-handling switch-

the casings with many severely corroded.

es, RSPs remain relatively easy. IED operators identify the

5. Exposure. IED pressure plates often can be found in the

location of the IED’s component parts and then take semi-

open and on the surface due to the action of rain water

remote action against either the power source or the detona-

washing away less compacted earth covering them.

tor. A careful fingertip isolation of the switch, main charge,

6. Human. Local residents who either have witnessed, have

and any other suspected component easily allows them to
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Image 9. Four complete VOIEDs neutralized by a local national IED operator in the al Shuhada district of Fallujah
on 24 January 2019.
Image courtesy of UNMAS.

negate the presence of additional detonators or power sources prior to semi-remotely breaking the circuit. Hook-and-line
procedures further reduce any residual risk to search teams in
completing the neutralization of devices.
Skills. The simple environment model has implications for operations transferred to local national personnel when appropriately trained. Based on collected data and
UNMAS-documented operations, and the types of devices encountered, both search and RSPs can be broken down
into simple, basic drills that can be taught, practiced, and assessed for relatively inexperienced personnel. According to
a year-long pilot study, after a six-week training course led
by experienced international technical advisors, a cadre of
predominantly former-ISF, IED-operator recruits deployed
as members of two Rapid Response Teams to Fallujah where
their work was monitored and found successful in terms of
IEDs located and rendered safe.
Variables. An assessment of UNMAS data compiled from

Image 10. A local national IEDD operator shows the results of his day’s work in Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS.

placed by ISIS operatives. Such old and new threats make continuing threat assessments necessary to ensure that processes
in use are not likely to be exploited by any belligerent forces.
Applicability. EH clearance operations, particularly in
high-threat and IED-laden contexts containing complex environments such as in Mosul (see companion article, page 13)
are, by definition, extremely expensive compared to relatively
simple environments such as Fallujah. Given the number of
IEDs, the worldwide effort to address clearance in a timely,
cost-effective way while protecting operators has become a
matter for further data analysis and revised models. Effective
business plans need to start with solid, applicable field experience quantified by data and driving an operational concept.
To date, the UNMAS Iraq experience in Fallujah says this is
possible even in the short term and is already being tried and
has proven to be a working concept.
See endnotes page 60

Fallujah suggests three variables define a simple environment
model for conducting IED clearance both there and in similar environments. Moreover, it suggests a simple environment
model could benefit from a second order analysis and evaluation of data related to interaction of these three variables.
Caveat. The simple environment model, like all models, depends upon assumptions and conditions continuing without
change, which may not be the case for at least two reasons.
First, the ISF previously conducted render-safe clearance of
some IED belts near Fallujah according to military standards
and under combat conditions, which necessitates an approach
different from humanitarian standards. In many cases, these
military RSPs require only the removal of detonators, probably
by hand, while leaving the charge in place, which, within the
context of humanitarian clearance standards constitutes a potential threat. Second, evidence suggests that Iraq is not yet a
fully post-conflict environment insofar as IEDs continue to be
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